Friday, September 26, 2003
Clark & the Republicans |Talking Points Memo 9/26 | by Joshua Micah Marshall
Marshall continues to counter criticisms of WKC with research and well-reasoned arguments. Today he takes up just how much should be made of the general's speaking at Republican events and seeming to support the administration before joining CNN just before 9/11.
He concludes: There's this idea afoot that Clark got into the Democratic party out of some sort of opportunism, and that this happened after 9/11. Frankly, this makes no sense. Is there really any time over the last two years that getting into the Democratic party would have seemed like a good way to get into office or advance politically? Particularly in a state like Arkansas which has been trending Republican? I mean, sad to say, but I don't see it. At the moment, President Bush is looking weaker and weaker. But that's pretty recent. Clark is clearly new to the Democratic party on many levels. But as explanations go, this strikes me as an awfully weak one.
Marshall continues to counter criticisms of WKC with research and well-reasoned arguments. Today he takes up just how much should be made of the general's speaking at Republican events and seeming to support the administration before joining CNN just before 9/11.
He concludes: There's this idea afoot that Clark got into the Democratic party out of some sort of opportunism, and that this happened after 9/11. Frankly, this makes no sense. Is there really any time over the last two years that getting into the Democratic party would have seemed like a good way to get into office or advance politically? Particularly in a state like Arkansas which has been trending Republican? I mean, sad to say, but I don't see it. At the moment, President Bush is looking weaker and weaker. But that's pretty recent. Clark is clearly new to the Democratic party on many levels. But as explanations go, this strikes me as an awfully weak one.
Hack's Target: Reporting for Duty: Wesley Clark
Retired lt. general David Hackworth, oft quoted by the right for coining the memorable aspersion "perfumed prince," is man enough to change his mind in this column for SFTT.org (Soldiers For the Truth). Interviewing Clark for Maxim (have they also interviewed Lieberman?), Hackworth raves: For the record, I never served with Clark. But after spending three hours interviewing the man for Maxim’s November issue, I’m impressed. He is insightful, he has his act together, he understands what makes national security tick – and he thinks on his feet somewhere around Mach 3. No big surprise, since he graduated first in his class from West Point, which puts him in the super-smart set with Robert E. Lee, Douglas MacArthur and Maxwell Taylor.
Almost more interesting is Hackworth's expression of the professional soldier's disdain for the chickenhawks: No doubt he’s made his share of enemies. He doesn’t suffer fools easily and wouldn’t have allowed the dilettantes who convinced Dubya to do Iraq to even cut the White House lawn. So he should prepare for a fair amount of dart-throwing from detractors he’s ripped into during the past three decades.
Eating a little crow, Hackworth acknowledges Hey, I am one of those: I took a swing at Clark during the Kosovo campaign when I thought he screwed up the operation, and I called him a “Perfumed Prince.” Only years later did I discover from his book and other research that I was wrong – the blame should have been worn by British timidity and William Cohen, U.S. SecDef at the time.
Perhaps most encouraging is this homely little detail: At the interview, Clark came along without the standard platoon of handlers and treated the little folks who poured the coffee and served the bacon and eggs with exactly the same respect and consideration he gave the biggies in the dining room like my colleague Larry King and Bob Tisch, the Regency Hotel’s owner. An appealing common touch.
Someone who attended the DNC fundraiser after the Democratic debate yesterday reported that Clark made it a point to go back to the kitchen at the hotel's ballroom to thank the staff for their efforts. Ahh, the gentile courtesy of the real Southerner.
Hackworth's conclusion is the stuff of double-truck newspaper ads for blockbuster movies: But if he wins the election, don’t expect an Andrew Jackson field-soldier type. Clark’s an intellectual, and his military career is more like Ike’s – that of a staff guy and a brilliant high-level commander. Can he make tough decisions? Bet on it. Just like Ike did during his eight hard but prosperous years as president.
Maybe's he's looking for a job. Why should he be different?
Retired lt. general David Hackworth, oft quoted by the right for coining the memorable aspersion "perfumed prince," is man enough to change his mind in this column for SFTT.org (Soldiers For the Truth). Interviewing Clark for Maxim (have they also interviewed Lieberman?), Hackworth raves: For the record, I never served with Clark. But after spending three hours interviewing the man for Maxim’s November issue, I’m impressed. He is insightful, he has his act together, he understands what makes national security tick – and he thinks on his feet somewhere around Mach 3. No big surprise, since he graduated first in his class from West Point, which puts him in the super-smart set with Robert E. Lee, Douglas MacArthur and Maxwell Taylor.
Almost more interesting is Hackworth's expression of the professional soldier's disdain for the chickenhawks: No doubt he’s made his share of enemies. He doesn’t suffer fools easily and wouldn’t have allowed the dilettantes who convinced Dubya to do Iraq to even cut the White House lawn. So he should prepare for a fair amount of dart-throwing from detractors he’s ripped into during the past three decades.
Eating a little crow, Hackworth acknowledges Hey, I am one of those: I took a swing at Clark during the Kosovo campaign when I thought he screwed up the operation, and I called him a “Perfumed Prince.” Only years later did I discover from his book and other research that I was wrong – the blame should have been worn by British timidity and William Cohen, U.S. SecDef at the time.
Perhaps most encouraging is this homely little detail: At the interview, Clark came along without the standard platoon of handlers and treated the little folks who poured the coffee and served the bacon and eggs with exactly the same respect and consideration he gave the biggies in the dining room like my colleague Larry King and Bob Tisch, the Regency Hotel’s owner. An appealing common touch.
Someone who attended the DNC fundraiser after the Democratic debate yesterday reported that Clark made it a point to go back to the kitchen at the hotel's ballroom to thank the staff for their efforts. Ahh, the gentile courtesy of the real Southerner.
Hackworth's conclusion is the stuff of double-truck newspaper ads for blockbuster movies: But if he wins the election, don’t expect an Andrew Jackson field-soldier type. Clark’s an intellectual, and his military career is more like Ike’s – that of a staff guy and a brilliant high-level commander. Can he make tough decisions? Bet on it. Just like Ike did during his eight hard but prosperous years as president.
Maybe's he's looking for a job. Why should he be different?
Thursday, September 25, 2003
The Clark Critique - Newsweek excerpt from General Clark's forthcoming book, Winning Modern Wars
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, many in the Bush administration seemed most focused on a prospective move against Iraq. This was the old idea of “state sponsorship”—even though there was no evidence of Iraqi sponsorship of 9/11 whatsoever—and the opportunity to “roll it all up.” I could imagine the arguments. War to unseat Saddam Hussein promised concrete, visible action.
I WENT BACK through the Pentagon in November 2001, and one of the senior military staff officers had time for a chat. Yes, we were still on track for going against Iraq, he said. But there was more. This was being discussed as part of a five-year campaign plan, he said, and there were a total of seven countries, beginning with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. So, I thought, this is what they mean when they talk about “draining the swamp.” It was evidence of the Cold War approach: Terrorism must have a “state sponsor,” and it would be much more effective to attack a state than to chase after individuals, nebulous organizations, and shadowy associations.
He said it with reproach—with disbelief, almost—at the breadth of the vision. I moved the conversation away, for this was not something I wanted to hear. And it was not something I wanted to see moving forward, either. What a mistake! I reflected—as though the terrorism were simply coming from these states. Well, that might be true for Iran, which still supported Hezbollah, and Syria, complicit in aiding Hamas and Hezbollah. But neither Hezbollah nor Hamas were targeting Americans. Why not build international power against Al Qaeda? But if we prioritized the threat against us from any state, surely Iran was at the top of the list, with ongoing chemical and biological warfare programs, clear nuclear aspirations, and an organized, global terrorist arm.
And what about the real sources of terrorists—U.S. allies in the region like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia? Wasn’t it the repressive policies of the first, and the corruption and poverty of the second, that were generating many of the angry young men who became terrorists? And what of the radical ideology and direct funding spewing from Saudi Arabia? Wasn’t that what was holding the radical Islamic movement together? What about our NATO allies, whose cities were being used as staging bases and planning headquarters? Why weren’t we putting greater effort into broader preventive measures?
The way to beat terrorists was to take away their popular support. Target their leaders individually, demonstrate their powerlessness, roll up the organizations from the bottom. I thought it would be better to drive them back into one or two states that had given them support, and then focus our efforts there.
And if we wanted to go after states supporting terrorism, why not first go to the United Nations, present the evidence against Al Qaeda, set up a tribunal for prosecuting international terrorism? Why not develop resolutions that would give our counterterrorist efforts the greater force of international law and gain for us more powerful leverage against any state that might support terrorists, then use international law and backed by the evidence to rope in the always nuanced Europeans that still kept open trade with Iran and the others?
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, many in the Bush administration seemed most focused on a prospective move against Iraq. This was the old idea of “state sponsorship”—even though there was no evidence of Iraqi sponsorship of 9/11 whatsoever—and the opportunity to “roll it all up.” I could imagine the arguments. War to unseat Saddam Hussein promised concrete, visible action.
I WENT BACK through the Pentagon in November 2001, and one of the senior military staff officers had time for a chat. Yes, we were still on track for going against Iraq, he said. But there was more. This was being discussed as part of a five-year campaign plan, he said, and there were a total of seven countries, beginning with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. So, I thought, this is what they mean when they talk about “draining the swamp.” It was evidence of the Cold War approach: Terrorism must have a “state sponsor,” and it would be much more effective to attack a state than to chase after individuals, nebulous organizations, and shadowy associations.
He said it with reproach—with disbelief, almost—at the breadth of the vision. I moved the conversation away, for this was not something I wanted to hear. And it was not something I wanted to see moving forward, either. What a mistake! I reflected—as though the terrorism were simply coming from these states. Well, that might be true for Iran, which still supported Hezbollah, and Syria, complicit in aiding Hamas and Hezbollah. But neither Hezbollah nor Hamas were targeting Americans. Why not build international power against Al Qaeda? But if we prioritized the threat against us from any state, surely Iran was at the top of the list, with ongoing chemical and biological warfare programs, clear nuclear aspirations, and an organized, global terrorist arm.
And what about the real sources of terrorists—U.S. allies in the region like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia? Wasn’t it the repressive policies of the first, and the corruption and poverty of the second, that were generating many of the angry young men who became terrorists? And what of the radical ideology and direct funding spewing from Saudi Arabia? Wasn’t that what was holding the radical Islamic movement together? What about our NATO allies, whose cities were being used as staging bases and planning headquarters? Why weren’t we putting greater effort into broader preventive measures?
The way to beat terrorists was to take away their popular support. Target their leaders individually, demonstrate their powerlessness, roll up the organizations from the bottom. I thought it would be better to drive them back into one or two states that had given them support, and then focus our efforts there.
And if we wanted to go after states supporting terrorism, why not first go to the United Nations, present the evidence against Al Qaeda, set up a tribunal for prosecuting international terrorism? Why not develop resolutions that would give our counterterrorist efforts the greater force of international law and gain for us more powerful leverage against any state that might support terrorists, then use international law and backed by the evidence to rope in the always nuanced Europeans that still kept open trade with Iran and the others?
Business Week Online | September 29, 2003 | Clark: What's Wrong with U.S. Policy in Iraq
Business Week's Bruce Nussbaum gives WKC's forthcoming Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire a positive review and paraphrases some highlights.
His new book . . . is, in effect, Clark's campaign manifesto, providing insights into what he believes and what he would do as Commander-in-Chief. As a book, it is a smart take on the battlefield tactics used in Iraq as well as a tough-minded critique of the military strategy and the geopolitical doctrine followed by the Bush Administration.
Agree or disagree with the four-star general, here is what he says:
-- The war in Iraq "has thus far been a perfect example of dominating an enemy force but failing to win the victory." Clark says the Administration made the classic mistake of equating the defeat of an enemy with achieving its larger political goal. That goal was to set up a democratic, stable, secular Iraq which would help stop terrorism. Clark argues that this required higher force levels and a different strategy . . . . The Pentagon's war strategy, in effect, had "a profound flaw -- the endgame."
-- The war in Iraq has weakened, not strengthened, the fight against terrorism "by diverting attention, resources and leadership, alienating allied supporters and serving as a rallying point for anyone wishing to do harm to the U.S. and Americans." . . . The Administration was caught up in the Cold War policy template of fighting states, not supranational terrorists such as al Qaeda, and was predisposed to attack Iraq well before September.
Safety can come only through joint intelligence and police work with close allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, he says, and through a greater focus on homeland security; regime change is a diversion. "Not only did the Bush Administration misunderstand the lessons of modern war, it made a policy blunder of historic proportions," he writes.
-- The Rumsfeld doctrine of making the U.S. military a smaller, more mobile, more high-tech force is responsible for the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and for the postwar chaos in Iraq. Clark, a four-star U.S. Army general, places the current debate over transforming the military within a broader fight between the Air Force and Army that goes back to World War II. This is one of the more intriguing aspects of his book. Clark says that the Air Force has been trying for decades to prove that it can win wars alone, without the Army, through decisive and devastating air power. Rumsfeld, of course, is an ex-Navy pilot and a believer in air power. Clark concedes that air power won out in Serbia and Kosovo. But while he backs high-tech warfare, Clark also sees boots on the ground as essential. Special Ops units working with the Air Force couldn't destroy al Qaeda, but a division of Army soldiers might have. "It was a strategic opportunity lost."
-- Iraq may destroy the all-volunteer Army. Clark spends dozens of pages exalting the bravery and abilities of the men and women of the armed forces in his book. But he warns that the U.S. Army is not an army of occupation. The "quasi-imperial" America envisioned by the neocons in the Bush Administration is not matched by the military force that is supposed to create it. Nor should it be, according to Clark. He argues that the U.S. military is built for war-fighting, not long-term policing.
-- American unilateralism is bad military policy and bad foreign policy. Clark sharply criticizes the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America paper that postulates a unilateral, preemptive foreign policy for the country. . . . In effect, he says that the U.S. doesn't do nation-building very well and should outsource it to the U.N.
Nussbaum concludes with this thumbs-up appraisal: Winning Modern Wars succeeds on many levels, including the Stephen E. Ambrose-like description of battles and tactics used by General Tommy Franks in pacing the war. Clark clearly admires the courage and capabilities of the soldiers on the ground. But he also presents a cogent critique of Pentagon leadership and White House politics. As a military man, his insights go beyond the predictable Republican-Democratic partisan dialogue. It's a valuable perspective no matter which candidate you vote for.
Business Week's Bruce Nussbaum gives WKC's forthcoming Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire a positive review and paraphrases some highlights.
His new book . . . is, in effect, Clark's campaign manifesto, providing insights into what he believes and what he would do as Commander-in-Chief. As a book, it is a smart take on the battlefield tactics used in Iraq as well as a tough-minded critique of the military strategy and the geopolitical doctrine followed by the Bush Administration.
Agree or disagree with the four-star general, here is what he says:
-- The war in Iraq "has thus far been a perfect example of dominating an enemy force but failing to win the victory." Clark says the Administration made the classic mistake of equating the defeat of an enemy with achieving its larger political goal. That goal was to set up a democratic, stable, secular Iraq which would help stop terrorism. Clark argues that this required higher force levels and a different strategy . . . . The Pentagon's war strategy, in effect, had "a profound flaw -- the endgame."
-- The war in Iraq has weakened, not strengthened, the fight against terrorism "by diverting attention, resources and leadership, alienating allied supporters and serving as a rallying point for anyone wishing to do harm to the U.S. and Americans." . . . The Administration was caught up in the Cold War policy template of fighting states, not supranational terrorists such as al Qaeda, and was predisposed to attack Iraq well before September.
Safety can come only through joint intelligence and police work with close allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, he says, and through a greater focus on homeland security; regime change is a diversion. "Not only did the Bush Administration misunderstand the lessons of modern war, it made a policy blunder of historic proportions," he writes.
-- The Rumsfeld doctrine of making the U.S. military a smaller, more mobile, more high-tech force is responsible for the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and for the postwar chaos in Iraq. Clark, a four-star U.S. Army general, places the current debate over transforming the military within a broader fight between the Air Force and Army that goes back to World War II. This is one of the more intriguing aspects of his book. Clark says that the Air Force has been trying for decades to prove that it can win wars alone, without the Army, through decisive and devastating air power. Rumsfeld, of course, is an ex-Navy pilot and a believer in air power. Clark concedes that air power won out in Serbia and Kosovo. But while he backs high-tech warfare, Clark also sees boots on the ground as essential. Special Ops units working with the Air Force couldn't destroy al Qaeda, but a division of Army soldiers might have. "It was a strategic opportunity lost."
-- Iraq may destroy the all-volunteer Army. Clark spends dozens of pages exalting the bravery and abilities of the men and women of the armed forces in his book. But he warns that the U.S. Army is not an army of occupation. The "quasi-imperial" America envisioned by the neocons in the Bush Administration is not matched by the military force that is supposed to create it. Nor should it be, according to Clark. He argues that the U.S. military is built for war-fighting, not long-term policing.
-- American unilateralism is bad military policy and bad foreign policy. Clark sharply criticizes the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America paper that postulates a unilateral, preemptive foreign policy for the country. . . . In effect, he says that the U.S. doesn't do nation-building very well and should outsource it to the U.N.
Nussbaum concludes with this thumbs-up appraisal: Winning Modern Wars succeeds on many levels, including the Stephen E. Ambrose-like description of battles and tactics used by General Tommy Franks in pacing the war. Clark clearly admires the courage and capabilities of the soldiers on the ground. But he also presents a cogent critique of Pentagon leadership and White House politics. As a military man, his insights go beyond the predictable Republican-Democratic partisan dialogue. It's a valuable perspective no matter which candidate you vote for.
The New Republic Online: Mad About You, The Case for Bush Hatred by Jonathan Chait, 9/29/03
No stunning insights in Chait's analysis of why Bush inspires such a viscerally negative response, but he articulates what many only sputter.
Highlights:
Bush is never called to task for the radical disconnect between how he got into office and what he has done since arriving. Reporters don't ask if he has succeeded in "changing the tone." Even the fact that Bush lost the popular vote is hardly ever mentioned. Liberals hate Bush not because he has succeeded but because his success is deeply unfair and could even be described as cheating.
Conservatives believe liberals resent Bush in part because he is a rough-hewn Texan. In fact, they hate him because they believe he is not a rough-hewn Texan but rather a pampered frat boy masquerading as one, with his pickup truck and blue jeans serving as the perfect props to disguise his plutocratic nature.
Every aspect of Bush's personal history points to the ways in which American life continues to fall short of the meritocratic ideal.
Say what you will about WKC, he is meritocracy defined.
But perhaps most infuriating of all is the fact that liberals do not see their view of Bush given public expression. It's not that Bush has been spared from any criticism--far from it. It's that certain kinds of criticism have been largely banished from mainstream discourse.
This is why it hardly bothers me that Clark voted for Nixon or Reagan. "Discourse" should be a bi-partisan goal and thus an attempt to shine light upon the gray areas. Clinton's balanced budget came at the expense of certain entitlements. Similarly, Clark's worldview, particularly as it concerns foreign policy, might rightly be informed by significant Republican presidents.
The persistence of an absurdly heroic view of Bush is what makes his dullness so maddening. To be a liberal today is to feel as though you've been transported into some alternative universe in which a transparently mediocre man is revered as a moral and strategic giant. You ask yourself why Bush is considered a great, or even a likeable, man. You wonder what it is you have been missing. Being a liberal, you probably subject yourself to frequent periods of self-doubt. But then you conclude that you're actually not missing anything at all. You decide Bush is a dullard lacking any moral constraints in his pursuit of partisan gain, loyal to no principle save the comfort of the very rich, unburdened by any thoughtful consideration of the national interest, and a man who, on those occasions when he actually does make a correct decision, does so almost by accident.
There. That feels better.
No stunning insights in Chait's analysis of why Bush inspires such a viscerally negative response, but he articulates what many only sputter.
Highlights:
Bush is never called to task for the radical disconnect between how he got into office and what he has done since arriving. Reporters don't ask if he has succeeded in "changing the tone." Even the fact that Bush lost the popular vote is hardly ever mentioned. Liberals hate Bush not because he has succeeded but because his success is deeply unfair and could even be described as cheating.
Conservatives believe liberals resent Bush in part because he is a rough-hewn Texan. In fact, they hate him because they believe he is not a rough-hewn Texan but rather a pampered frat boy masquerading as one, with his pickup truck and blue jeans serving as the perfect props to disguise his plutocratic nature.
Every aspect of Bush's personal history points to the ways in which American life continues to fall short of the meritocratic ideal.
Say what you will about WKC, he is meritocracy defined.
But perhaps most infuriating of all is the fact that liberals do not see their view of Bush given public expression. It's not that Bush has been spared from any criticism--far from it. It's that certain kinds of criticism have been largely banished from mainstream discourse.
This is why it hardly bothers me that Clark voted for Nixon or Reagan. "Discourse" should be a bi-partisan goal and thus an attempt to shine light upon the gray areas. Clinton's balanced budget came at the expense of certain entitlements. Similarly, Clark's worldview, particularly as it concerns foreign policy, might rightly be informed by significant Republican presidents.
The persistence of an absurdly heroic view of Bush is what makes his dullness so maddening. To be a liberal today is to feel as though you've been transported into some alternative universe in which a transparently mediocre man is revered as a moral and strategic giant. You ask yourself why Bush is considered a great, or even a likeable, man. You wonder what it is you have been missing. Being a liberal, you probably subject yourself to frequent periods of self-doubt. But then you conclude that you're actually not missing anything at all. You decide Bush is a dullard lacking any moral constraints in his pursuit of partisan gain, loyal to no principle save the comfort of the very rich, unburdened by any thoughtful consideration of the national interest, and a man who, on those occasions when he actually does make a correct decision, does so almost by accident.
There. That feels better.
Wednesday, September 24, 2003
Why Money Won't Matter - Jonathan Alter in Newsweek 9/29/03
Newsweek's cover story "package" is both less provocative and more informative than most of the TV and newspaper coverage has been so far and deserves to be blogged in total. This piece on money explores the "nuances" in a way the general can appreciate.
Fund-raising at this stage is a fancy poll. You can have half as much cash as the next guy and still win. The issue: Clark’s political skills If Wes Clark goes nowhere, you can already hear the tired punditry: He didn’t have enough cash. He started too late. Blah, blah, blah. This analysis has already begun, though it is close to meaningless. LET’S START WITH THE MONEY. In the primary season, fund-raising is mostly just a fancy and not terribly accurate poll—a way to measure support among the wealthy and, with the Internet, the passionate. You can have half as much money as the next guy and still win because, unlike Senate campaigns, presidential contests are fought out in the “free media,” where live-TV skills trump paid ads. Money helps build a field organization that can cushion later missteps, but it’s the symptom, not the cause, of success. I’ve seen candidates win Super Tuesday states where they had no ads on the air and only a half-dozen volunteers on the ground. Remember: momentum generates money, not the other way around.
Similarly, early starts are relevant only if the candidate is simultaneously obscure and in touch with the national mood, like Jimmy Carter in 1976. Four and a half months—the time between now and the first primaries—is plenty of time to introduce oneself to the voters. While it’s true that Iowa and New Hampshire voters like to meet their presidential candidates personally before they vote for them, there’s an easy solution for Clark—skip the cumbersome, labor-intensive Iowa caucuses, where the Democratic Party is not in sync with the military anyway. Al Gore in 1988 and John McCain in 2000 blew off Iowa and paid no price; they lost the nomination for other reasons.
Will the Clark team spin "losses" in Iowa and NH this way? Stay tuned.Let’s admit it: the “money primary” and early field organizing are covered so extensively so that we political reporters have something to do before the real fun begins. Sorry to use another sports metaphor, but this is like handicapping the baseball season based on the size of a team’s payroll and how early the players report to spring training. It sounds obvious, but the only real way to judge both athletes and politicians is by how they perform on the field. Can they keep it between the foul lines? Execute a squeeze play? Work the umpires (in this case, reporters)?
The political equivalent of these attributes boils down to timing, message and temperament. If a candidate can master all three—and not alienate the press—his future is bright. While Clark looks to be in good shape on the first two, the third remains a big question mark. He has to adapt to all the requirements of this different sport. When Michael Jordan tried out for the White Sox, he could run and field but couldn’t hit.
That's why they pay the big bucks at the news weeklies: this is the kind of objective analysis I hope the new campaign team is offering, and it goes to my earlier point that WKC is playing much better to the troops than the pundits.Clark’s timing is exquisite. In any other election year, a former general wouldn’t have a chance in the Democratic Party, which is deeply ambivalent about the military. But active Democrats know that they must restore credibility on this issue to stay competitive as a party. Even if he fades, Clark helps in that process. Republicans are already trying to tar him with the Clinton brush; both are Rhodes scholars from Arkansas (though not close friends), and a chunk of Clinton’s staff is joining Clark. Yet even Karl Rove might have trouble turning a winner of the Silver Star into a weenie. Clark pushed so hard to liberate Kosovo in 1999 that he alienated the other brass. They were wrong and he was right, and millions of lives were saved. The timing is good for a humanitarian hawk. Although he hasn’t yet outlined specifics, Clark’s message is also strong. It will basically be that he is more in touch than Bush on domestic policy and more competent on foreign policy.
This season, competence in the Oval Office is critical, at home and abroad. Re-election campaigns are all rehire/fire decisions. Because the voters went through something big and traumatic with President Bush on 9/11 and most felt he did a good job, he has a reservoir of psychic support to draw on. So the anger Howard Dean represents is not a terrific general-election message. A stronger message for Democrats is that the voters must reluctantly fire this likable president because he’s not performing. Clark is in a good position to make that case.
The issue for Clark is temperament. A friend of his told me last week that he had “never seen him relax.” A moment later the friend added that to win, Clark “must relax.” It may be that Clark has too thin a skin about his thin skin and may resent efforts to make him confront the rookie mistakes that have already begun. Even so, some of the interpersonal issues are being overplayed in the press. in “War in a Time of Peace,” David Halberstam writes that Clark “saw brilliantly what was in front of him ... like a laser scope.” Great quality in a president.
But Halberstam also writes that “his peripheral vision ... was considerably more limited.” This is a potentially deadly flaw: politics is all about sensing the audience around you. Clark could be disciplined enough to teach himself these skills—or they may be unteachable. The wonderful thing about the grueling process of a presidential campaign is that we will soon learn the answer. Either way, it’s a lot more relevant to his political fate than how much money he pulls in at his next fund-raiser.
Tony Soprano Goes to the United Nations
To his admirers, Pres. Eisenhower's penchant for golf relected the image of a Bob Hope, easy going and confident, while Bill Clinton's inability to keep it in his pants reminded the more indulgent of us of Michael Caine's Alfie. Ronald Reagan struck skeptics as a close cousin of Sleepy from the Seven Dwarfs, while Gerald Ford might have been a prototype for "Dumb and Dumber."
George W. Bush, of course, would like to inspire comparisons with all the great Hollywood heroes of the air, from "Twelve O'Clock High" to "Top Gun." But those who witnessed his more than usually snarky appearance before the United Nations yesterday might have noticed striking similarities to one of contemporary pop culture's most complex yet amoral anti-heroes, Tony Soprano.
Remember the episode where Tony takes over the business of a "degenerate" gambler who can't pay his vig? Tony and his crew exact payment by "busting out" the poor schmuck's sporting goods store, purchasing thousands of dollars in merchandise for which they have no intention of paying but will resell at a 100% profit. Davey Scatino, thrown out of his house for good measure, moves into his store and sleeps in a tent.
Another degenerate gambler, Saddam Hussein, infuriated us by refusing to roll over and beg after the first Gulf war, and when members of his Rotary Club exposed our homeland security as, well, insecure, we decided we'd set an example for others who failed to respect us as the guys in the white hats. And how would we reimburse ourselves for the trouble and expense Saddam caused us? In oil, of course, which while it would eventually enable the average Iraqi to purchase an SUV, would in the meantime prevent the cost of fuelling Arnold's Hummer from approaching the cost of the Hummer itself.
When Iraqi oil didn't readily squirt out of the ground into the gas tanks of our Escalades, another tactic from the Tony Soprano play book suggested itself. Let's say Tony's waste management was being threatened by "unfair" competition from one of those big high-tech conglomerates moving in on his "accounts." He might have a sit-down with Johnny Sack from across the river and ask Johnny to send some of his boys over to New Jersey to teach the interlopers a lesson about unfair competition. Given that they share corrupt politicians and many other business interests, Tony would be justifiably upset if Johnny asked him for a piece of the waste management business for helping with this little problem.
Perhaps next season Asian mobsters might threaten Tony and Johnny's thing on both sides of the Hudson, but the bad blood left over from the failed garbage negotiation would taint any unified effort to fend them off. That might just be the end of the Sopranos. Word is the West Wing is shifting to the right. Here's hoping they regret that move going into the 2005 season.
To his admirers, Pres. Eisenhower's penchant for golf relected the image of a Bob Hope, easy going and confident, while Bill Clinton's inability to keep it in his pants reminded the more indulgent of us of Michael Caine's Alfie. Ronald Reagan struck skeptics as a close cousin of Sleepy from the Seven Dwarfs, while Gerald Ford might have been a prototype for "Dumb and Dumber."
George W. Bush, of course, would like to inspire comparisons with all the great Hollywood heroes of the air, from "Twelve O'Clock High" to "Top Gun." But those who witnessed his more than usually snarky appearance before the United Nations yesterday might have noticed striking similarities to one of contemporary pop culture's most complex yet amoral anti-heroes, Tony Soprano.
Remember the episode where Tony takes over the business of a "degenerate" gambler who can't pay his vig? Tony and his crew exact payment by "busting out" the poor schmuck's sporting goods store, purchasing thousands of dollars in merchandise for which they have no intention of paying but will resell at a 100% profit. Davey Scatino, thrown out of his house for good measure, moves into his store and sleeps in a tent.
Another degenerate gambler, Saddam Hussein, infuriated us by refusing to roll over and beg after the first Gulf war, and when members of his Rotary Club exposed our homeland security as, well, insecure, we decided we'd set an example for others who failed to respect us as the guys in the white hats. And how would we reimburse ourselves for the trouble and expense Saddam caused us? In oil, of course, which while it would eventually enable the average Iraqi to purchase an SUV, would in the meantime prevent the cost of fuelling Arnold's Hummer from approaching the cost of the Hummer itself.
When Iraqi oil didn't readily squirt out of the ground into the gas tanks of our Escalades, another tactic from the Tony Soprano play book suggested itself. Let's say Tony's waste management was being threatened by "unfair" competition from one of those big high-tech conglomerates moving in on his "accounts." He might have a sit-down with Johnny Sack from across the river and ask Johnny to send some of his boys over to New Jersey to teach the interlopers a lesson about unfair competition. Given that they share corrupt politicians and many other business interests, Tony would be justifiably upset if Johnny asked him for a piece of the waste management business for helping with this little problem.
Perhaps next season Asian mobsters might threaten Tony and Johnny's thing on both sides of the Hudson, but the bad blood left over from the failed garbage negotiation would taint any unified effort to fend them off. That might just be the end of the Sopranos. Word is the West Wing is shifting to the right. Here's hoping they regret that move going into the 2005 season.
A U.S. soldier in Iraq wonders: 'How many more must die?'
Tim Predmore is on active duty with the 101st Airborne Division near Mosul, Iraq. . . . He has been in Iraq since March and in the military for about five years. Another serviceman who feels dissed by his commander-in-chief.
"Shock and Awe" were the words used to describe the awesome display of power the world was to view upon the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It was to be an up-close, dramatic display of military strength and advanced technology within the arsenal of the United States and the United Kingdom's military.
But as a soldier preparing for the invasion of Iraq, the words "shock and awe" rang deeper within my psyche. These two great superpowers were about to break the very rules they demand of others. Without the consent of the United Nations, and ignoring the pleas of their own citizens, the United States and Britain invaded Iraq.
"Shock and Awe"? Yes, the words correctly described the emotional impact I felt as we prepared to participate in what I believed not to be an act of justice but of hypocrisy.
From the moment the first shot was fired in this so-called war of liberation and freedom, hypocrisy reigned. Following the broadcasting of recorded images of captured and dead U.S. soldiers over Arab television, American and British leaders vowed revenge while verbally assaulting the networks for displaying such vivid images. Yet within hours of the deaths of Saddam's two sons, the American government released horrific photos of the two dead brothers for the entire world to view. Again, a "do as we say and not as we do" scenario.
As soldiers serving in Iraq, we have been told that our purpose here is to help the people of Iraq by providing them the necessary assistance militarily as well as in humanitarian efforts. Then tell me where the humanity was in the recent Stars and Stripes account of two young children brought to a U.S. military camp by their mother, in search of medical care? The two children had been, unbeknownst to them, playing with explosive ordinance they had found and as a result were severely burned. The account tells how the two children, following an hour-long wait, were denied care by two U.S. military doctors. The soldier described the incident as one of many "atrocities" he has witnessed on the part of the U.S. military.
So then, what is our purpose here? Was this invasion due to weapons of mass destruction as we so often heard? If so, where are they? Did we invade to dispose of a leader and his regime on the account of close association with Osama bin Laden? If so, where is the proof? Or is it that our incursion is a result of our own economic advantage? Iraq's oil can be refined at the lowest cost of any in the world. Coincidence?
Is this true? I wonder why that is if so.
This looks like a modern-day crusade not to free an oppressed people or to rid the world of a demonic dictator relentless in his pursuit of conquest and domination but a crusade to control another nation's natural resource. At least for us here, oil seems to be the reason for our presence.
Whoaaa, I thought at first Predmore was a poster-boy for Clark but this bitterness sounds more like Dean. Even I don't think it was only about oil, though you got to wonder how guys who eat, sleep and drink the stuff didn't know how run-down Iraq's oil industry was or how to protect it from sabotage.
There is only one truth, and it is that Americans are dying. There are an estimated 10- to 14-attacks on our servicemen and women daily in Iraq. As the body count continues to grow, it would appear that there is no immediate end in sight.
I once believed that I served for a cause: "to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States."
Now, I no longer believe; I have lost my conviction, my determination. I can no longer justify my service for what I believe to be half-truths and bold lies. My time is done as well as that of many others with whom I serve. We have all faced death here without reason or justification.
How many more must die? How many more tears must be shed before America awakens and demands the return of the men and women whose job it is to protect them rather than their leader's interest?
With that, we might consider to what extent this degree of demoralization renders Predmore even more vulnerable to injury. Sad. Sad. Sad.
Tim Predmore is on active duty with the 101st Airborne Division near Mosul, Iraq. . . . He has been in Iraq since March and in the military for about five years. Another serviceman who feels dissed by his commander-in-chief.
"Shock and Awe" were the words used to describe the awesome display of power the world was to view upon the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It was to be an up-close, dramatic display of military strength and advanced technology within the arsenal of the United States and the United Kingdom's military.
But as a soldier preparing for the invasion of Iraq, the words "shock and awe" rang deeper within my psyche. These two great superpowers were about to break the very rules they demand of others. Without the consent of the United Nations, and ignoring the pleas of their own citizens, the United States and Britain invaded Iraq.
"Shock and Awe"? Yes, the words correctly described the emotional impact I felt as we prepared to participate in what I believed not to be an act of justice but of hypocrisy.
From the moment the first shot was fired in this so-called war of liberation and freedom, hypocrisy reigned. Following the broadcasting of recorded images of captured and dead U.S. soldiers over Arab television, American and British leaders vowed revenge while verbally assaulting the networks for displaying such vivid images. Yet within hours of the deaths of Saddam's two sons, the American government released horrific photos of the two dead brothers for the entire world to view. Again, a "do as we say and not as we do" scenario.
As soldiers serving in Iraq, we have been told that our purpose here is to help the people of Iraq by providing them the necessary assistance militarily as well as in humanitarian efforts. Then tell me where the humanity was in the recent Stars and Stripes account of two young children brought to a U.S. military camp by their mother, in search of medical care? The two children had been, unbeknownst to them, playing with explosive ordinance they had found and as a result were severely burned. The account tells how the two children, following an hour-long wait, were denied care by two U.S. military doctors. The soldier described the incident as one of many "atrocities" he has witnessed on the part of the U.S. military.
So then, what is our purpose here? Was this invasion due to weapons of mass destruction as we so often heard? If so, where are they? Did we invade to dispose of a leader and his regime on the account of close association with Osama bin Laden? If so, where is the proof? Or is it that our incursion is a result of our own economic advantage? Iraq's oil can be refined at the lowest cost of any in the world. Coincidence?
Is this true? I wonder why that is if so.
This looks like a modern-day crusade not to free an oppressed people or to rid the world of a demonic dictator relentless in his pursuit of conquest and domination but a crusade to control another nation's natural resource. At least for us here, oil seems to be the reason for our presence.
Whoaaa, I thought at first Predmore was a poster-boy for Clark but this bitterness sounds more like Dean. Even I don't think it was only about oil, though you got to wonder how guys who eat, sleep and drink the stuff didn't know how run-down Iraq's oil industry was or how to protect it from sabotage.
There is only one truth, and it is that Americans are dying. There are an estimated 10- to 14-attacks on our servicemen and women daily in Iraq. As the body count continues to grow, it would appear that there is no immediate end in sight.
I once believed that I served for a cause: "to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States."
Now, I no longer believe; I have lost my conviction, my determination. I can no longer justify my service for what I believe to be half-truths and bold lies. My time is done as well as that of many others with whom I serve. We have all faced death here without reason or justification.
How many more must die? How many more tears must be shed before America awakens and demands the return of the men and women whose job it is to protect them rather than their leader's interest?
With that, we might consider to what extent this degree of demoralization renders Predmore even more vulnerable to injury. Sad. Sad. Sad.
Tuesday, September 23, 2003
Rangel an unlikely ally of Clark
As a native New Yorker, I am thrilled that Charlie Rangel, representative for New York's 15th Congressional District which comprises East and Central Harlem, the Upper West Side, and Washington Heights/Inwood, is among the first in Congress to endorse WKC. He's truly one of the good guys. And he's anything but an unlikely ally of Clark. If anything Colin Powell is an unlikely ally of Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld. Congressman Rangel, who bootstrapped himself into a position of prominence in the Democratic Party and the House, understands that the odds of lawyers, doctors, and bankers emerging from Harlem are a bit better than those of Rhodes scholars and world citizens hailing from Arkansas. Their mutual concerns geo-politically are basic to "acting locally": education, health care,voter registrationnn, bullet-proof voting machines, tolerance, and equal economic opportunity. These are all fundamentals of democracy that tend to be neglected or abused when a region is impoverished and beknighted. Genuine public servants, Charlie, Wes, and Bill will never be truly wealthy, but they will have legacies that survive in the communities they helped to improve. A true Democrat, Rep. Rangel is all about transcending differences, a regular Great Society kind of a guy. Thanks to www.citizenonline.net for this excellent profile.
Rep. Charlie Rangel (D-N.Y.) did not study foreign policy at invitation-only seminars underwritten by major foundations. Nor was he ever the favorite protege of a powerful, senior diplomat. For him, there was never to be a junior year abroad.
No, as a 20-year old high-school dropout from Harlem, Cpl. Charles Rangel had a total immersion course in foreign policy in a place called Korea, when his outnumbered Army unit was overrun in combat by Chinese communist forces. For valor under fire, Charlie Rangel earned the Bronze Star. For wounds he sustained from enemy fire, Charlie Rangel was awarded the Purple Heart.
Rangel is no professional veteran: “I got shot. I got out. I went back to high school. Never looked back, and I have never had a bad day since.”
Thanks to the GI Bill and his own hard work, he graduated with honors from New York University and St. John’s Law School before winning election to the House in 1970. Today, Rangel, with unconcealed passion, speaks on two intimately related subjects: how much he opposes the entire U.S. war against Iraq, and how strongly he supports former Gen. Wesley Clark for president.
“This war hurts and scares and pains me more than anything except combat,” he admits. Speaking almost sadly, he tells of half a dozen nearly identical personal exchanges with President George W. Bush. Each time the president, with obvious sincerity, asks the same question: “Do you know, Charlie, why we’re hated so much?” After Rangel confesses, “I really don’t know, Mr. President,” Mr. Bush answers his own question: “Because they’re evil, Charlie. Because they’re evil.”
Rangel believes the president and some close to him “decided that Saddam Hussein on Sept. 11 offered the perfect target to cut this evil of animosity out of civilization, democracy and the world.” But there was one major problem, according to the New York Democrat: “They had no idea what the hell they were doing. They had no idea what it would cost – no idea that little countries with no money and a lot of pride would tell us to go straight to hell.”
The onetime Army enlisted man detests the big picture, big thinkers who argue that, for the United States, “the only way to have credibility is to be willing to kill and to die.”
Of such theoreticians, Rangel asks: “Do you know anyone who is going to die? Who the hell are you talking about? Some nameless, paid gladiators?”
Would a reinstituted military draft, advocated in legislation by Rangel and Sen. Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (D-S.C.) have made any difference in the pre-war debate or the vote on the war in Congress? (What's that about? Ed.)
“You bet your bottom dollar,” says Rangel, offering the typical reaction from a Hill colleague: “’I believe we have to fight. I believe we have to die. But good God, man, you mean my son? My grandson? You mean someone in my neighborhood? I’m going to have to go to the funeral? Let’s take another look at this.’”
But then, Rangel saw “this general on TV, and the general is not a right-wing Republican.” But why Wesley Clark? “Most of all, I want someone to say to the world: ‘I’m an American. I’m a former four-star general. I love my country. I’m president of the United States. Can we talk?’”
And what would the reaction be? “They’re going to fall all over themselves, saying, ‘Thank you, buddy, I’ve been waiting for you.’ They’re even going to say, like after a marital spat: ‘I said some hurtful things I didn’t mean. I was only trying to get your attention.’”
How important is military service to his candidate’s chances? “Clark is intimidating to anyone who did not serve our country.”
Clark should know this about Rangel. In 1984, Rangel endorsed Walter Mondale for president over Jesse Jackson, who drew enormous support from African American voters. Many African American politicians, anxious to avoid accusations of disloyalty to a presidential candidate of their own race, rushed to jump on the Jackson bandwagon. Not Charlie Rangel. He stuck with Fritz Mondale. He’s the kind of guy you want to have with you in a foxhole.
Would you like an exit strategy with your jobless recovery?
To stay in, we've got to define our exit strategy - General (Ret.) Wesley K. Clark in the London Times, 7/1/03
The deaths of US and British soldiers, the continuing violence and economic sabotage, and the rising popular resentment at the Western presence are just the first cracks in the facade of postwar American-British occupation. Every student of Iraq issued a warning about the aftermath of war: deep fault lines between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, with additional tensions caused by Islamic extremists, Baathists and Arab nationalists, would make it difficult to hold the state together. The questions are, is this effort "winnable?" If so, how? And at what cost?
Let's be realistic: measured against the objectives, we haven't done so well yet.
Weapons of mass destruction have not yet been found - but the intelligence suggested, at a minimum, that Saddam Hussein had some chemical and biological capabilities. Weapons may have been hidden in Syria, buried underground, or given to terrorists - or perhaps the intelligence simply overestimated the threat. We must continue the search - we have most of the resources we need to be successful in place already - but each week increases the likelihood that some of these weapons may end up in the wrong hands.
Good point: the Anyone But Bush league tend to imply that if the weapons existed Blix would have found them, which is potentially almost as dangerous a position as the demagogic gun Rumsfeld and Cheney pointed to our heads. I think it's safe to assume that Saddam had WMDs he could employ locally, and that just as we can assume he and Bin Laden are still at large, someone knows where they are. WKC speaks realistically, not moralistically, and hence claims the non-partisan high ground.
As for regime change, Saddam and his sons no longer occupy their palaces or control the Government. Yet their survival feeds fears of a Baathist return, sparks continued resistance, and undercuts efforts to establish new institutions.
Has the capture of the sons made any difference. I'm sure I don't know.
Efforts to locate and track the Baathist leaders must continue. But this requires deep penetration into Iraqi society. We have radio and telephone listening devices and are working to recruit additional agents, but there are no guarantees of success. Each unsuccessful week of effort reveals the limits of US intelligence and influence, and each week is likely to see the Baathist resistance grow.
To my mind there's a big difference between WKC saying "intelligence doesn't know everything" so we can't count on them for all of the answers, and Cheney telling Tim Russert, "We don't know," but trust us on this.
(MR. RUSSERT: The Washington Post asked the American people about Saddam Hussein, and this is what they said: 69 percent said he was involved in the September 11 attacks. Are you surprised by that?
VICE PRES. CHENEY: No. I think it's not surprising that people make that connection.
MR. RUSSERT: But is there a connection?
VICE PRES. CHENEY: We don't know. You and I talked about this two years ago. I can remember you asking me this question just a few days after the original attack. At the time I said no, we didn't have any evidence of that.)
Meanwhile a deeper, private struggle is ongoing between various factions in the Shia community. Will they secure dominance over their Shiism from the Iranians, and re-centre the sect on Najaf? Will they succumb to pressures from Iran? Will they demand a fundamentalist theocratic state, or some form of "modern" theocracy that combines Islamic law with limited democratic forms? The Shia issue is potentially the most explosive. If they are able to move together, they will dominate Iraq. But in the press here we see only the barest surface ripples from the major movements underneath.
Nuance is all as WKC might say, but will he be able to make arguments this subtle as commander-in-chief? Why isn't Gen. Clark sending the press to these stories?
Shia leaders know the threat of the Baathists. Even now they must be assessing the options. They could help the coalition to defeat the Baathists, and then ask the coalition to leave; remain neutral, and wait for both the Baathists and the coalition to exhaust themselves; or work with the Baathists, on their own terms, seeking control inside the Baathist organisation and building pressure against the Americans and Brits. Right now, some of this is likely occurring.
Regardless of the twists and turns of internal Islamic activities, the outcome seems clear - the US and the Britultimatelyutimately be invited to leave; how soon depends upon our effectiveness in the occupation. The manner of our departure may follow from a quiet series of meetings with Iraqi clerics, it may be in massive street protests that shut down commerce and traffic; or it may be punctuated by violence on a scale far greater than yet seen against Americans and the Iraqis who have co-operated with the coalition.
And in the north are the Kurds. They are armed and largely self-governing. Independence will be the next step, should Western nation-building efforts falter.
And unless other measures are taken, independence will be accompanied by internal violence and possible conflict with Iran or Turkey. As for all those other grandiose dreams - transforming Arab society, inspiring democracy, finding the key to peace in the Middle East - well, it comes down first to whether we can handle the challenges of dealing with the here and now in Iraq.
Success is not impossible, but it will be difficult, and it grows more so with each passing day.
It is simply not possible to maintain this occupation by force, even if we doubled the forces committed there. The actions against the Baathists - the sweeps, strikes and searches - risk the kind of popular ire that resulted in six British soldiers being killed near al-Amarah.
So what can be done now? A successful outcome would be to solve the mystery of the WMD, suppress the Baathist resurgence and hold Iraq together, leaving it self-governing in some semblance of secular democracy, secured by its own armed forces, free from domination by other regional powers or terrorists. Winning in Iraq requires working with the existing forces in that society, not against them. Representative Iraqi institutions - national, regional and local councils - need to be established to work with the US and UK civilian administrators. These institutions must leave no one out, including former Baathists, who should be given an opportunity to renounce their former loyalties.
The internal squabbling and scheming must be forced out into the open and the press invited in. We must propose responsibilities, procedures for decision-making, and standards for protecting the rights of the various factions in the councils, and retain the authority to admonish, remove or hold accountable leaders who don't follow the rules.
The art will be to govern fairly, to create common interests and to lay in these early institutions the seeds for democratic, tolerant and limited government.
There should be no democratic elections until much later. Incidentally, let's make no mistake about oil revenues, impounded Iraqi funds, or profiteering by US and British companies. We must continue to set aside any idea that this occupation could be Iraqi-financed.
Another example of WKC's unique pov: on one hand he debunks the ever-pollyanna-ish notion that Iraq could, would or should support our war. On the other he appears to be agreeing with the administration against the French that Iraq is a long way from voting for a democratic government, which dictates our being there for years, not months.
The US and UK must also recruit and equip tens of thousands of Iraqis to handle the security and reconstruction responsibilities of the occupation. Yes, they must be trained and vetted - but this must be done quickly. Iraqis must be put in uniform and on to the streets alongside the US and British Forces as soon as possible, and thousands of translators must be brought in. Iraqi faces must be seen to carry out some of the tougher chores like the searches for weapons, responses to complaints, guarding facilities and pursuing criminals. And there should be a prohibition of searches in the absence of translators.
So far Clark is the only politician stressing the need for translators (corrections welcome), which is so commonsensical and yet innovative, it deserves to be discussed in a separate article.
Communications with the Iraqi public is crucial. Western forces must take extraordinary measures to combat rumours, fears and suspicions. This means more transparency in decision-making and complete reporting on the results of the patrols and searches. Why can't we have our own 24-hour news channel in Arabic? Military forces must find new ways to provide this transparency without it hobbling operational methods and aims.
Where is the Voice of America in all this?
Do we have the staying power for what we're facing in Iraq? First, let's be honest with ourselves. We went into this mission with a myopic focus on the Iraqi threat - we underestimated the strength of the Baathists, inadequately anticipated the resistance during the fighting, underresourced the force required to deal with military "success" and failed to plan fully how to create "regime change". The American and British public need to hear it from their leaders; they need to understand why these mistakes were made and see that those responsible are held accountable. And then we've got to persuade others to help us to shoulder these burdens - the mission is simply bigger than the US and UK can handle. We should be asking the UN and other international institutions to take a greater role.
Sounds like a position to me.
While the civil administration in Baghdad would likely agree with most of these ideas, it has not implemented these programmes with the required urgency nor has it specified the end state it seeks.
If we are successful, the cost of this mission will be measured in years, tens of billions of dollars and dozens more soldiers' lives lost. But failure will be more expensive, and a premature pull-out will exacerbate regional conflict and undercut the War on Terror. So, we need to lock in a defined exit strategy, as we've done in Bosnia, to bring the British and American people and the international community on board: we need to create a matrix measuring progress in political development, economic reconstruction and security, and to announce the report card quarterly. But above all, honesty, and remember, when the Iraqis ask us to go, the mission is over.
I thought the mission would be over when Cheney said, "You may be excused." By requiring a "report card," WKC is certainly following normal organizational practice when one has a boss to satisfy. Too bad Bush Inc. seem to think they're accountable only to each other, and not the world.
To stay in, we've got to define our exit strategy - General (Ret.) Wesley K. Clark in the London Times, 7/1/03
The deaths of US and British soldiers, the continuing violence and economic sabotage, and the rising popular resentment at the Western presence are just the first cracks in the facade of postwar American-British occupation. Every student of Iraq issued a warning about the aftermath of war: deep fault lines between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, with additional tensions caused by Islamic extremists, Baathists and Arab nationalists, would make it difficult to hold the state together. The questions are, is this effort "winnable?" If so, how? And at what cost?
Let's be realistic: measured against the objectives, we haven't done so well yet.
Weapons of mass destruction have not yet been found - but the intelligence suggested, at a minimum, that Saddam Hussein had some chemical and biological capabilities. Weapons may have been hidden in Syria, buried underground, or given to terrorists - or perhaps the intelligence simply overestimated the threat. We must continue the search - we have most of the resources we need to be successful in place already - but each week increases the likelihood that some of these weapons may end up in the wrong hands.
Good point: the Anyone But Bush league tend to imply that if the weapons existed Blix would have found them, which is potentially almost as dangerous a position as the demagogic gun Rumsfeld and Cheney pointed to our heads. I think it's safe to assume that Saddam had WMDs he could employ locally, and that just as we can assume he and Bin Laden are still at large, someone knows where they are. WKC speaks realistically, not moralistically, and hence claims the non-partisan high ground.
As for regime change, Saddam and his sons no longer occupy their palaces or control the Government. Yet their survival feeds fears of a Baathist return, sparks continued resistance, and undercuts efforts to establish new institutions.
Has the capture of the sons made any difference. I'm sure I don't know.
Efforts to locate and track the Baathist leaders must continue. But this requires deep penetration into Iraqi society. We have radio and telephone listening devices and are working to recruit additional agents, but there are no guarantees of success. Each unsuccessful week of effort reveals the limits of US intelligence and influence, and each week is likely to see the Baathist resistance grow.
To my mind there's a big difference between WKC saying "intelligence doesn't know everything" so we can't count on them for all of the answers, and Cheney telling Tim Russert, "We don't know," but trust us on this.
(MR. RUSSERT: The Washington Post asked the American people about Saddam Hussein, and this is what they said: 69 percent said he was involved in the September 11 attacks. Are you surprised by that?
VICE PRES. CHENEY: No. I think it's not surprising that people make that connection.
MR. RUSSERT: But is there a connection?
VICE PRES. CHENEY: We don't know. You and I talked about this two years ago. I can remember you asking me this question just a few days after the original attack. At the time I said no, we didn't have any evidence of that.)
Meanwhile a deeper, private struggle is ongoing between various factions in the Shia community. Will they secure dominance over their Shiism from the Iranians, and re-centre the sect on Najaf? Will they succumb to pressures from Iran? Will they demand a fundamentalist theocratic state, or some form of "modern" theocracy that combines Islamic law with limited democratic forms? The Shia issue is potentially the most explosive. If they are able to move together, they will dominate Iraq. But in the press here we see only the barest surface ripples from the major movements underneath.
Nuance is all as WKC might say, but will he be able to make arguments this subtle as commander-in-chief? Why isn't Gen. Clark sending the press to these stories?
Shia leaders know the threat of the Baathists. Even now they must be assessing the options. They could help the coalition to defeat the Baathists, and then ask the coalition to leave; remain neutral, and wait for both the Baathists and the coalition to exhaust themselves; or work with the Baathists, on their own terms, seeking control inside the Baathist organisation and building pressure against the Americans and Brits. Right now, some of this is likely occurring.
Regardless of the twists and turns of internal Islamic activities, the outcome seems clear - the US and the Britultimatelyutimately be invited to leave; how soon depends upon our effectiveness in the occupation. The manner of our departure may follow from a quiet series of meetings with Iraqi clerics, it may be in massive street protests that shut down commerce and traffic; or it may be punctuated by violence on a scale far greater than yet seen against Americans and the Iraqis who have co-operated with the coalition.
And in the north are the Kurds. They are armed and largely self-governing. Independence will be the next step, should Western nation-building efforts falter.
And unless other measures are taken, independence will be accompanied by internal violence and possible conflict with Iran or Turkey. As for all those other grandiose dreams - transforming Arab society, inspiring democracy, finding the key to peace in the Middle East - well, it comes down first to whether we can handle the challenges of dealing with the here and now in Iraq.
Success is not impossible, but it will be difficult, and it grows more so with each passing day.
It is simply not possible to maintain this occupation by force, even if we doubled the forces committed there. The actions against the Baathists - the sweeps, strikes and searches - risk the kind of popular ire that resulted in six British soldiers being killed near al-Amarah.
So what can be done now? A successful outcome would be to solve the mystery of the WMD, suppress the Baathist resurgence and hold Iraq together, leaving it self-governing in some semblance of secular democracy, secured by its own armed forces, free from domination by other regional powers or terrorists. Winning in Iraq requires working with the existing forces in that society, not against them. Representative Iraqi institutions - national, regional and local councils - need to be established to work with the US and UK civilian administrators. These institutions must leave no one out, including former Baathists, who should be given an opportunity to renounce their former loyalties.
The internal squabbling and scheming must be forced out into the open and the press invited in. We must propose responsibilities, procedures for decision-making, and standards for protecting the rights of the various factions in the councils, and retain the authority to admonish, remove or hold accountable leaders who don't follow the rules.
The art will be to govern fairly, to create common interests and to lay in these early institutions the seeds for democratic, tolerant and limited government.
There should be no democratic elections until much later. Incidentally, let's make no mistake about oil revenues, impounded Iraqi funds, or profiteering by US and British companies. We must continue to set aside any idea that this occupation could be Iraqi-financed.
Another example of WKC's unique pov: on one hand he debunks the ever-pollyanna-ish notion that Iraq could, would or should support our war. On the other he appears to be agreeing with the administration against the French that Iraq is a long way from voting for a democratic government, which dictates our being there for years, not months.
The US and UK must also recruit and equip tens of thousands of Iraqis to handle the security and reconstruction responsibilities of the occupation. Yes, they must be trained and vetted - but this must be done quickly. Iraqis must be put in uniform and on to the streets alongside the US and British Forces as soon as possible, and thousands of translators must be brought in. Iraqi faces must be seen to carry out some of the tougher chores like the searches for weapons, responses to complaints, guarding facilities and pursuing criminals. And there should be a prohibition of searches in the absence of translators.
So far Clark is the only politician stressing the need for translators (corrections welcome), which is so commonsensical and yet innovative, it deserves to be discussed in a separate article.
Communications with the Iraqi public is crucial. Western forces must take extraordinary measures to combat rumours, fears and suspicions. This means more transparency in decision-making and complete reporting on the results of the patrols and searches. Why can't we have our own 24-hour news channel in Arabic? Military forces must find new ways to provide this transparency without it hobbling operational methods and aims.
Where is the Voice of America in all this?
Do we have the staying power for what we're facing in Iraq? First, let's be honest with ourselves. We went into this mission with a myopic focus on the Iraqi threat - we underestimated the strength of the Baathists, inadequately anticipated the resistance during the fighting, underresourced the force required to deal with military "success" and failed to plan fully how to create "regime change". The American and British public need to hear it from their leaders; they need to understand why these mistakes were made and see that those responsible are held accountable. And then we've got to persuade others to help us to shoulder these burdens - the mission is simply bigger than the US and UK can handle. We should be asking the UN and other international institutions to take a greater role.
Sounds like a position to me.
While the civil administration in Baghdad would likely agree with most of these ideas, it has not implemented these programmes with the required urgency nor has it specified the end state it seeks.
If we are successful, the cost of this mission will be measured in years, tens of billions of dollars and dozens more soldiers' lives lost. But failure will be more expensive, and a premature pull-out will exacerbate regional conflict and undercut the War on Terror. So, we need to lock in a defined exit strategy, as we've done in Bosnia, to bring the British and American people and the international community on board: we need to create a matrix measuring progress in political development, economic reconstruction and security, and to announce the report card quarterly. But above all, honesty, and remember, when the Iraqis ask us to go, the mission is over.
I thought the mission would be over when Cheney said, "You may be excused." By requiring a "report card," WKC is certainly following normal organizational practice when one has a boss to satisfy. Too bad Bush Inc. seem to think they're accountable only to each other, and not the world.
Positions? We Got 'Em!
yin.blog-city.com Notes on Gen. Wesley Clark's appearance in Iowa
Tung-yin of "The Yin Blog" offered some good news at the end of a tough week. What a difference 24 hours makes, or maybe the general prefers to pontificate over lunch rather than in flight. My choice of words is deliberate: if a president can't pontificate (and hopefully Wes is using his Shakti Gawain affirmation training to imagine himself there) who can? A little bit of Bryan's "cross of gold" rhetoric never goes amiss on the trail to the White House (I know Bryan lost - three times! But for Iowa and the primaries Wesley needs to awaken his Inner Populist).
As I mentioned previously, retired Gen. Wesley Clark came to Iowa today to deliver the annual Levitt Lecture at the University of Iowa. . . . He had lunch at the law school with the faculty, and I was lucky enough to be at the table he came to. I say "lucky" because I had plenty of opportunity to ask Gen. Clark questions and to follow up on some of them in this informal environment.
Here are some quick thoughts on various issues discussed at the lunch table, during the informal Q&A session just afterward, or during his Levitt Lecture:
* On social security, he seems to think that the solution to the anticipated deficit was to raise the cap on the Social Security taxes (i.e., currently, only the first $87,000 or so of income is subject to the payroll tax). He is against raising the retirement age, because that is the same as a cut in benefits. At the same time, he recognizes that the "lockbox" concept is nonsense, because the government has a "unified" budget.
* On the kinds of judicial nominees he would aim for, he said that he would look for ones who bring balance and no ideological agenda; he identified Justices Breyer and Souter as examples.
* He thinks that Bush v. Gore was a bad decision because the Supreme Court shouldn't have intervened into such a matter. I pointed out that his ideal Justices both agreed with the big 5 that the Florida recount process violated the Equal Protection Clause, and he agreed that the standard was problematic and wrong. When Randy pressed him, he suggested that the courts should have used an "intent of the voter" standard, as illustrated by the ballots by Jewish voters with the double votes for Buchanan and Gore (meaning, I suppose, that the voter intended to vote for Gore but messed up at first and picked Buchanan). This was actually not a very good answer, since Randy pointed out that there was no way to know whether a given voter was Jewish, a point that Gen. Clark conceded.
* On whether the Chinese government should be forced to revalue the Yuan (unit of currency), he agreed that it would need to be done in the long run, but thinks it can't be done right now because there are too many underperforming loans in the Chinese economic system. Essentially, the Chinese economy needs to be fixed before revaluation can be done.
* He likes the French. In fact, just before he stepped down as the NATO Supreme Commander, a French political leader told him, "You should have been French!" Coming from the French, that sounds like high praise. He did note that the French suffer from a similar problem to what he believes the current administration suffers from, namely, too narrow of a view of self-interest.
* He believes that going into Iraq was a mistake because Iraq posed no imminent threat and there was time to take other measures. He would not have voted for a measure allowing the President to go to war (over Iraq), although he would have voted for a resolution to give the President "leverage" provided that the President would have had to come back to Congress. [This was not at the lunch table, so I didn't have a chance to ask him what kind of resolution he had in mind. It sounds like maybe what he meant is that the resolution would have allowed the President to seek U.N. approval, which would then be followed by an actual vote by Congress to authorize military force.]
* However, now that we are in Iraq, we can't just pull out -- that would lead to chaos and all but invite Al Qaeda to move in.
* He believes that preemptive strikes are warranted under appropriate circumstances, though they should be subject to extremely stringent standards of proof. He would not want the President to say, in response to a threat, "Gee, let's wait and see if it really is anthrax, and when people get sick in New York, then we'll get mad."
* On gays in the military, he believed at the time that the "Don't ask, don't tell" policy was okay, but he also pointed out that back in the days of the draft, being gay would not get you excused. He now believes that the policy should be reevaluated because it does not seem to be working well. He favors the British policy, which is "Don't ask, don't misbehave." Interestingly, he explained that "Don't ask, don't tell" seemed to work better in the Army than in the Navy or Air Force. The Army, he said, was constantly short on resources and hence did not have time to spend on determining whether a soldier was gay. The Air Force, in contrast, was full of "spooks" who were going around intimidating airmen and airwomen.
Fascinating, but why alienate the Air Force brass? The general's a loquacious sort.
* He sees three major issues in the election: (1) the war on terrorism; (2) the economy; and (3) the future of the American presidency.
* "How did we get here?" He traces the current split between the U.S. and continental Europe not to Iraq, but rather to the end of the Cold War. "What happened is we won . . . and we lost. We lost our mission, our sense of purpose. It had been to contain the expansion of communism, to deter Russian attacks, to help fledgling democracies." Now, he says, we are "rudderless." What should be our direction?
If Bush Inc. didn't have Weapons Of Mass Destruction to revive the Cold War, it would have had to find another us vs. them paradigm to fuel their morality-driven crusade. Probably faith vs. atheism. Doesn't what's left of the Republican center realize that the evangelicals and neo-cons have more in common with radical Islam than the center of either party? Did these guys miss the lectures on the Constitution because their frat parties ran too late the night before?
1) Inclusiveness: "You don't make us safer by erecting walls to keep others out, but by building bridges. . . ."
2) International organizations: "We have to use international institutions, not condemn and abuse them." We need the U.N., and the U.N. needs us, he said.
3) Use of force: We should believe in a strong and effective military, but we should also realize that force is to be used as a last resort. "It's very difficult to change people's minds when you are bombing and killing them."
Who in the administration wants to change their minds? Looks like we just want to bomb and kill 'em.
* On terrorism, he favors focusing on the terrorists and funding, as opposed to countries. However, in probably the most controversial part of his speech, he singled out Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt as the "central fronts" -- Saudi Arabia because of "hatred spewing out of" the country, Pakistan because of its madrassas, and Egypt to a lesser extent.
Now we're speaking Truth to Power. As long as our "allies" in the region find it politically expedient to support groups that demonize us, our bombs, and boots on the ground will never give Americans their money's worth, much less squelch terrorism.
* On whether U.S. soldiers should serve in U.N. missions led by non-Americans, he was skeptical. The U.N. was fine for observer or peacekeeping missions, but for missions with the serious potential for military conflict, the U.N. had no military command capability. He prefers a NATO command, because "we trust NATO commanders." But he emphasized the need for the U.N. imprimatur because around the rest of the world, what the U.N. says is law.
* He did realize that aspects of the U.N. were less than perfect. He refused to defend the fact that Syria is chairing the U.N. Disarmament Commission and that Libya is chairing the U.N. Humans Rights Commission, labeling those as "absurd."
. . . I have to say that given the breadth of questions he was getting, he showed remarkable command of factual matters and political issues. What I was most impressed with was his willingness to accept reality and to state clear opinions.
I've read across the blogosphere that Gen. Clark comes across as cold and impersonal, but here in Iowa he did not seem that way.
So if one agrees that the above represents a satisfactory exposition of WKC's current positions, why aren't they emerging from the past week's encounters with the press? Is the press suppressing the general's views, or has he simply failed thus far to reduce them to slogans? One of Wes' favorite words seems to be nuance. It reminds me of what my dad, a retired corporate executive and employment counselor has always told me, "Getting the job and doing the job are two completely different things." Heck, in this economy, even the best resume isn't as important as acing the interview. Welcome to the club, Gen. Clark. We'll do our best to make sure you aren't underemployed.
yin.blog-city.com Notes on Gen. Wesley Clark's appearance in Iowa
Tung-yin of "The Yin Blog" offered some good news at the end of a tough week. What a difference 24 hours makes, or maybe the general prefers to pontificate over lunch rather than in flight. My choice of words is deliberate: if a president can't pontificate (and hopefully Wes is using his Shakti Gawain affirmation training to imagine himself there) who can? A little bit of Bryan's "cross of gold" rhetoric never goes amiss on the trail to the White House (I know Bryan lost - three times! But for Iowa and the primaries Wesley needs to awaken his Inner Populist).
As I mentioned previously, retired Gen. Wesley Clark came to Iowa today to deliver the annual Levitt Lecture at the University of Iowa. . . . He had lunch at the law school with the faculty, and I was lucky enough to be at the table he came to. I say "lucky" because I had plenty of opportunity to ask Gen. Clark questions and to follow up on some of them in this informal environment.
Here are some quick thoughts on various issues discussed at the lunch table, during the informal Q&A session just afterward, or during his Levitt Lecture:
* On social security, he seems to think that the solution to the anticipated deficit was to raise the cap on the Social Security taxes (i.e., currently, only the first $87,000 or so of income is subject to the payroll tax). He is against raising the retirement age, because that is the same as a cut in benefits. At the same time, he recognizes that the "lockbox" concept is nonsense, because the government has a "unified" budget.
* On the kinds of judicial nominees he would aim for, he said that he would look for ones who bring balance and no ideological agenda; he identified Justices Breyer and Souter as examples.
* He thinks that Bush v. Gore was a bad decision because the Supreme Court shouldn't have intervened into such a matter. I pointed out that his ideal Justices both agreed with the big 5 that the Florida recount process violated the Equal Protection Clause, and he agreed that the standard was problematic and wrong. When Randy pressed him, he suggested that the courts should have used an "intent of the voter" standard, as illustrated by the ballots by Jewish voters with the double votes for Buchanan and Gore (meaning, I suppose, that the voter intended to vote for Gore but messed up at first and picked Buchanan). This was actually not a very good answer, since Randy pointed out that there was no way to know whether a given voter was Jewish, a point that Gen. Clark conceded.
* On whether the Chinese government should be forced to revalue the Yuan (unit of currency), he agreed that it would need to be done in the long run, but thinks it can't be done right now because there are too many underperforming loans in the Chinese economic system. Essentially, the Chinese economy needs to be fixed before revaluation can be done.
* He likes the French. In fact, just before he stepped down as the NATO Supreme Commander, a French political leader told him, "You should have been French!" Coming from the French, that sounds like high praise. He did note that the French suffer from a similar problem to what he believes the current administration suffers from, namely, too narrow of a view of self-interest.
* He believes that going into Iraq was a mistake because Iraq posed no imminent threat and there was time to take other measures. He would not have voted for a measure allowing the President to go to war (over Iraq), although he would have voted for a resolution to give the President "leverage" provided that the President would have had to come back to Congress. [This was not at the lunch table, so I didn't have a chance to ask him what kind of resolution he had in mind. It sounds like maybe what he meant is that the resolution would have allowed the President to seek U.N. approval, which would then be followed by an actual vote by Congress to authorize military force.]
* However, now that we are in Iraq, we can't just pull out -- that would lead to chaos and all but invite Al Qaeda to move in.
* He believes that preemptive strikes are warranted under appropriate circumstances, though they should be subject to extremely stringent standards of proof. He would not want the President to say, in response to a threat, "Gee, let's wait and see if it really is anthrax, and when people get sick in New York, then we'll get mad."
* On gays in the military, he believed at the time that the "Don't ask, don't tell" policy was okay, but he also pointed out that back in the days of the draft, being gay would not get you excused. He now believes that the policy should be reevaluated because it does not seem to be working well. He favors the British policy, which is "Don't ask, don't misbehave." Interestingly, he explained that "Don't ask, don't tell" seemed to work better in the Army than in the Navy or Air Force. The Army, he said, was constantly short on resources and hence did not have time to spend on determining whether a soldier was gay. The Air Force, in contrast, was full of "spooks" who were going around intimidating airmen and airwomen.
Fascinating, but why alienate the Air Force brass? The general's a loquacious sort.
* He sees three major issues in the election: (1) the war on terrorism; (2) the economy; and (3) the future of the American presidency.
* "How did we get here?" He traces the current split between the U.S. and continental Europe not to Iraq, but rather to the end of the Cold War. "What happened is we won . . . and we lost. We lost our mission, our sense of purpose. It had been to contain the expansion of communism, to deter Russian attacks, to help fledgling democracies." Now, he says, we are "rudderless." What should be our direction?
If Bush Inc. didn't have Weapons Of Mass Destruction to revive the Cold War, it would have had to find another us vs. them paradigm to fuel their morality-driven crusade. Probably faith vs. atheism. Doesn't what's left of the Republican center realize that the evangelicals and neo-cons have more in common with radical Islam than the center of either party? Did these guys miss the lectures on the Constitution because their frat parties ran too late the night before?
1) Inclusiveness: "You don't make us safer by erecting walls to keep others out, but by building bridges. . . ."
2) International organizations: "We have to use international institutions, not condemn and abuse them." We need the U.N., and the U.N. needs us, he said.
3) Use of force: We should believe in a strong and effective military, but we should also realize that force is to be used as a last resort. "It's very difficult to change people's minds when you are bombing and killing them."
Who in the administration wants to change their minds? Looks like we just want to bomb and kill 'em.
* On terrorism, he favors focusing on the terrorists and funding, as opposed to countries. However, in probably the most controversial part of his speech, he singled out Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt as the "central fronts" -- Saudi Arabia because of "hatred spewing out of" the country, Pakistan because of its madrassas, and Egypt to a lesser extent.
Now we're speaking Truth to Power. As long as our "allies" in the region find it politically expedient to support groups that demonize us, our bombs, and boots on the ground will never give Americans their money's worth, much less squelch terrorism.
* On whether U.S. soldiers should serve in U.N. missions led by non-Americans, he was skeptical. The U.N. was fine for observer or peacekeeping missions, but for missions with the serious potential for military conflict, the U.N. had no military command capability. He prefers a NATO command, because "we trust NATO commanders." But he emphasized the need for the U.N. imprimatur because around the rest of the world, what the U.N. says is law.
* He did realize that aspects of the U.N. were less than perfect. He refused to defend the fact that Syria is chairing the U.N. Disarmament Commission and that Libya is chairing the U.N. Humans Rights Commission, labeling those as "absurd."
. . . I have to say that given the breadth of questions he was getting, he showed remarkable command of factual matters and political issues. What I was most impressed with was his willingness to accept reality and to state clear opinions.
I've read across the blogosphere that Gen. Clark comes across as cold and impersonal, but here in Iowa he did not seem that way.
So if one agrees that the above represents a satisfactory exposition of WKC's current positions, why aren't they emerging from the past week's encounters with the press? Is the press suppressing the general's views, or has he simply failed thus far to reduce them to slogans? One of Wes' favorite words seems to be nuance. It reminds me of what my dad, a retired corporate executive and employment counselor has always told me, "Getting the job and doing the job are two completely different things." Heck, in this economy, even the best resume isn't as important as acing the interview. Welcome to the club, Gen. Clark. We'll do our best to make sure you aren't underemployed.
Monday, September 22, 2003
The general needs a campaign theme song!
I haven't figured it out, but for every good suggestion made, I'll drop one of the lamer candidates in the poll. I'm definitely showing my age; I can't think of anything from the 90s.
I haven't figured it out, but for every good suggestion made, I'll drop one of the lamer candidates in the poll. I'm definitely showing my age; I can't think of anything from the 90s.
Sunday, September 21, 2003
Boots on the Ground, Family Back Home - New York Times op-ed page, 9/21/03
Not a day after my Talking Point on the significance of the volunteer army as a constituency, Mark L. Kimmey, a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army Reserve, addresses concerns apparently ignored by the Defense Department, despite the assertions of Don Rumsfeld below. Col. Kimmey is a systems engineer in civilian life presently serving a tour in Iraq. Though his analysis is thoroughly non-political, as behooves an active officer, the facts as he sees them reveal the administration's bewildering failure to address the needs of our citizens who serve under arms. The tone of anger underlying his dignified complaint is palpable. But then given the failure of Bush Inc. to honor and support a commitment to first-responders at home, the bleakness of Col. Kimmey's outlook will come as no surprise.
He writes: The Army's decision to keep its Reserve forces in Iraq on duty for a full year from their arrival may have profound consequences for both the Army and the war in Iraq. While the Army will gain increased flexibility with its "boots on the ground," the long deployments may demoralize reservists. When mobilization and demobilization are included, 12 months on duty in Iraq will mean a 14- to 16-month separation from family and career for reservists.
. . . the message to reservists is unmistakable: the Army no longer takes into account sacrifices made to maintain two careers and lives. . . . For a reservist, every day in uniform is a day away from what might be (or might have been) a promising career. . . . Hardships on Reserve families have increased with longer and more frequent deployments. Reservists don't always have ready access to a military base and its support programs. Left to fend for themselves, Reserve families are becoming more vocal about their unhappiness with the situation. Politicians may not be listening to their complaints, but you can bet we husbands and wives overseas are hearing their pain.
The Army is fond of bragging about the advantages of the all-volunteer force. But reservists are volunteers, too. We sign up for the Reserve when we leave the Army because we want to continue to serve with people we respect. . . . The problem in Iraq is that the Army doesn't seem to know what to do with us. . . . In the case of my brigade, we've had nothing to do for almost a month. . . . The feeling throughout the ranks is that we are being held in place while someone tries to think of something for us to do. We've been assured that new orders will be published "any day now," but we've heard that before.
The advantage of experienced reservists to a unit is immeasurable. But here in Iraq, I am hearing more soldiers talk about calling it quits when they return to the States. Even though some soldiers are only four or five years from qualifying for retirement pay and benefits, they're getting out. The constant deployments are difficult for families and careers, they say, and waiting around for retirement benefits is no longer worth it.
The evidence I see in other units around me is the same: the United States Army is about to see a mass exodus from its Reserve. . . . If the Army continues its policy of year-plus tours for its Reserve forces in Iraq and elsewhere, it will soon find those ranks empty.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said that we need to be fair to reservists, their families and their employers. If reservists are forced to spend too much time on active duty, he said, "we're going to end up losing them, and we can't afford to lose them."
From my perspective, however, we're already losing them. The real impact of the Army's policy on Reserve deployments won't be felt until long after his watch. But because everything bad that happens is the commander's fault, Mr. Rumsfeld's tenure may be remembered less for its battlefield victories than for the damage it caused to the morale of the Army.
Given a choice between arrogance and incompetence or arrogance and an honorable peace, the self-assurance based on experience of a Wesley Clark should be encourgaged rather than despised. Col. Kimmey, with all his ability, loyalty, and patience, has been reduced to another date rape victim of Bush Inc. If you're old enough you remember the 4F's: "Find 'em, feel 'em, f*k 'em, forget 'em."
Karl Rove should go right after Rumsfeld if he thinks the volunteer army isn't a political minefield. And then there's New York City, my home town, characterized by the White House travel bureau as "a nice place to hold a convention, but I wouldn't want to live there."
Not a day after my Talking Point on the significance of the volunteer army as a constituency, Mark L. Kimmey, a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army Reserve, addresses concerns apparently ignored by the Defense Department, despite the assertions of Don Rumsfeld below. Col. Kimmey is a systems engineer in civilian life presently serving a tour in Iraq. Though his analysis is thoroughly non-political, as behooves an active officer, the facts as he sees them reveal the administration's bewildering failure to address the needs of our citizens who serve under arms. The tone of anger underlying his dignified complaint is palpable. But then given the failure of Bush Inc. to honor and support a commitment to first-responders at home, the bleakness of Col. Kimmey's outlook will come as no surprise.
He writes: The Army's decision to keep its Reserve forces in Iraq on duty for a full year from their arrival may have profound consequences for both the Army and the war in Iraq. While the Army will gain increased flexibility with its "boots on the ground," the long deployments may demoralize reservists. When mobilization and demobilization are included, 12 months on duty in Iraq will mean a 14- to 16-month separation from family and career for reservists.
. . . the message to reservists is unmistakable: the Army no longer takes into account sacrifices made to maintain two careers and lives. . . . For a reservist, every day in uniform is a day away from what might be (or might have been) a promising career. . . . Hardships on Reserve families have increased with longer and more frequent deployments. Reservists don't always have ready access to a military base and its support programs. Left to fend for themselves, Reserve families are becoming more vocal about their unhappiness with the situation. Politicians may not be listening to their complaints, but you can bet we husbands and wives overseas are hearing their pain.
The Army is fond of bragging about the advantages of the all-volunteer force. But reservists are volunteers, too. We sign up for the Reserve when we leave the Army because we want to continue to serve with people we respect. . . . The problem in Iraq is that the Army doesn't seem to know what to do with us. . . . In the case of my brigade, we've had nothing to do for almost a month. . . . The feeling throughout the ranks is that we are being held in place while someone tries to think of something for us to do. We've been assured that new orders will be published "any day now," but we've heard that before.
The advantage of experienced reservists to a unit is immeasurable. But here in Iraq, I am hearing more soldiers talk about calling it quits when they return to the States. Even though some soldiers are only four or five years from qualifying for retirement pay and benefits, they're getting out. The constant deployments are difficult for families and careers, they say, and waiting around for retirement benefits is no longer worth it.
The evidence I see in other units around me is the same: the United States Army is about to see a mass exodus from its Reserve. . . . If the Army continues its policy of year-plus tours for its Reserve forces in Iraq and elsewhere, it will soon find those ranks empty.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said that we need to be fair to reservists, their families and their employers. If reservists are forced to spend too much time on active duty, he said, "we're going to end up losing them, and we can't afford to lose them."
From my perspective, however, we're already losing them. The real impact of the Army's policy on Reserve deployments won't be felt until long after his watch. But because everything bad that happens is the commander's fault, Mr. Rumsfeld's tenure may be remembered less for its battlefield victories than for the damage it caused to the morale of the Army.
Given a choice between arrogance and incompetence or arrogance and an honorable peace, the self-assurance based on experience of a Wesley Clark should be encourgaged rather than despised. Col. Kimmey, with all his ability, loyalty, and patience, has been reduced to another date rape victim of Bush Inc. If you're old enough you remember the 4F's: "Find 'em, feel 'em, f*k 'em, forget 'em."
Karl Rove should go right after Rumsfeld if he thinks the volunteer army isn't a political minefield. And then there's New York City, my home town, characterized by the White House travel bureau as "a nice place to hold a convention, but I wouldn't want to live there."
Talking point: It's a volunteer army!
We've heard a lot about these silly resume comparison polls which favor Clark by a broad margin over the president. That's good. It speaks to electability, but not about leadership. We live in a political world and so leadership for better or worse is defined periodically by the commitment of constituencies to a candidate. Commitment is obviously a lightning-rod value in the American cultural dialogue, to the extent that the administration permits dialogue. And commitment is important to every constituency, depending on how it's framed. The evangelical unwed mother of a teenage daughter may be committing her faith, her powers of communication, and her lifestyle to ensuring her loved one never needs an abortion due to unwed pregnancy. OTOH, the latest hip-hop artist out on parole may be equally committed: to a curious re-distribution of wealth, that takes the rights of others into account no more than our single mom, whether it be by the occasional armed robbery or the illicit sample. Discouraging the daughter from seeking an abortion or preventing the parolee from carrying a weapon may require more than the passage of a law. It might require a re-definition of commitment across the society.
So commitment is a good thing, even if its definition is not necessarily universally agreed upon. In the popular culture, whether we are talking about Eminem or Britney, commitment equates with intensity. Popular entertainment values are intentionally relative, satirical, and situational. We may not hold it against the single mom if she feels that every street-wise pop star is a potential Saddam Hussein (gives me something to talk about at parties with Don Rumsfeld.) We'll leave which of our odd couple is least likely to vote aside for now. So commitment is a pretty twisted sister at this point, and we don't need a government to cynically exploit it.
Getting back to commitment and the volunteer army. The "See Spot run" version is this:
1) We're at war
2) There seems to be momentum for keeping us at war for some time
3) The army is comprised of volunteers, who are professionals in a truly 21st Century sense, in that most will by preference and circumstance career-change out of the army and need to be replaced. The fluid workplace is a fact of the coming economy, yes?
4) We need a lot of warriors now and we will need more in the future. A draft will be on no one's platform in our lifetime.
So: let's take care of the armed forces. America's grown up: you can't make the argument anymore that if you're against the war, you're against the boys and girls , and that's great. No more can anybody accuse a soldier of being a capitalist tool and not appear a fool. Nobody doesn't like Sara Lee. Thankfully, though nobody is all that all over commitment in their own lives (divorce rate? Beniffer?), now we can start to think more about the boys and girls than about "The War." That's revolutionary, but it's what the general is suggesting by basing his candidacy on his incredibly important analysis of the Iraq war as "elective." What Clark won't say but I will say for him is: it's one thing to deal with an imminent threat and lose thousands of citizens committed to the safety of their fellow man. Mistakes will be made. But how dare you commit the armed forces of this great country to an elective, yet open-ended confrontation, without taking the dignity of these human beings into account. The president's agenda ultimately degrades our dignity while increasing our vulnerability and discontent. It is antithetical to a broadly based commitment. Put another way, we all need insurance and we realize, whatever our level of education, that the price of insurance is determined to some extent by the odds of the pay out. But for the president of the United States to ask his armed forces to accept actuarial odds against their death that his administration has arbitrarily set could be criminal. Not to speak of taking our social security trust to Las Vegas for a bachelor party/prayer breakfast. (Hopefully my anger is evolving into commitment.)
There is so much greater in the general's favor than the uniform gap with the president. The initiative Clark must seize is support from the first responders, the reservists who must be mighty uncomfortable with current events, the troops in the field, the guys who are a lot like he was 20 years ago, who know they will stick with their commitment to service, but hate to think that when they get home, their brother-in-law is still going to be living in the guest room. (Give Kerry props for his recent endorsement from the national fireman's union. Too bad nobody gives a damn.)
But that gets us to a another, and very delicate point, about the similarity between various contemporary violent professions. Mercenaries, professional security, intelligence officers, criminals, conspirators, frauds, sociopaths, drug dealers, arms brokers, industrial spies, general officers, and big city detectives all have in common that they have committed to living with the threat of violence because they live with the enemy. We pay a lot of guys to shoot at each other rather than us, either with our taxes or our consumer purchases.
Wesley Clark views the phenomenon of the first-person shooter game and its impact on crime from the perspective of a space station. That's the irony of the nickname his less-than-enamored subordinates allegedly gave him: "The Supreme Being." Napoleon has a resonance here as well, which is why DeLay's olboquy, Clark's a "blow-dried Napoleon" rings ironically true. The base of Napoleon's early support was due to his brilliance as an artillery strategist, but the foundation of his mission was his troops' embodiment of his physical, moral, emotional, and intellectual commitment. All good soldiers must love the study of history and that study is broader and richer than the mere employment of best practices.
No matter how Wesley Clark runs, he is a campaigning civics lesson. He has run a gauntlet already and made some enemies. Yet once more, he has re-enlisted. Faced with a potential adversary who has Air Force One at his command, the general is traveling in borrowed planes. If Wesley Clark fully connects with his inner citizen, the man who knew he was only borrowing the chateau in Belgium, we cannot all help but benefit. One of his colleagues called him "a national treasure." It seems unlikely that encomium was prompted by Gen. Clark's tipping him to an inside stock trade.
If we need the Army more than ever, it follows that Wesley Clark's mission is to support it. Wouldn't it be ironic if fifty years out the General's reformation of what it means to serve our country under arms resulted in an overall decline in the misuse of firearms, without special legislation to dictate it.
We've heard a lot about these silly resume comparison polls which favor Clark by a broad margin over the president. That's good. It speaks to electability, but not about leadership. We live in a political world and so leadership for better or worse is defined periodically by the commitment of constituencies to a candidate. Commitment is obviously a lightning-rod value in the American cultural dialogue, to the extent that the administration permits dialogue. And commitment is important to every constituency, depending on how it's framed. The evangelical unwed mother of a teenage daughter may be committing her faith, her powers of communication, and her lifestyle to ensuring her loved one never needs an abortion due to unwed pregnancy. OTOH, the latest hip-hop artist out on parole may be equally committed: to a curious re-distribution of wealth, that takes the rights of others into account no more than our single mom, whether it be by the occasional armed robbery or the illicit sample. Discouraging the daughter from seeking an abortion or preventing the parolee from carrying a weapon may require more than the passage of a law. It might require a re-definition of commitment across the society.
So commitment is a good thing, even if its definition is not necessarily universally agreed upon. In the popular culture, whether we are talking about Eminem or Britney, commitment equates with intensity. Popular entertainment values are intentionally relative, satirical, and situational. We may not hold it against the single mom if she feels that every street-wise pop star is a potential Saddam Hussein (gives me something to talk about at parties with Don Rumsfeld.) We'll leave which of our odd couple is least likely to vote aside for now. So commitment is a pretty twisted sister at this point, and we don't need a government to cynically exploit it.
Getting back to commitment and the volunteer army. The "See Spot run" version is this:
1) We're at war
2) There seems to be momentum for keeping us at war for some time
3) The army is comprised of volunteers, who are professionals in a truly 21st Century sense, in that most will by preference and circumstance career-change out of the army and need to be replaced. The fluid workplace is a fact of the coming economy, yes?
4) We need a lot of warriors now and we will need more in the future. A draft will be on no one's platform in our lifetime.
So: let's take care of the armed forces. America's grown up: you can't make the argument anymore that if you're against the war, you're against the boys and girls , and that's great. No more can anybody accuse a soldier of being a capitalist tool and not appear a fool. Nobody doesn't like Sara Lee. Thankfully, though nobody is all that all over commitment in their own lives (divorce rate? Beniffer?), now we can start to think more about the boys and girls than about "The War." That's revolutionary, but it's what the general is suggesting by basing his candidacy on his incredibly important analysis of the Iraq war as "elective." What Clark won't say but I will say for him is: it's one thing to deal with an imminent threat and lose thousands of citizens committed to the safety of their fellow man. Mistakes will be made. But how dare you commit the armed forces of this great country to an elective, yet open-ended confrontation, without taking the dignity of these human beings into account. The president's agenda ultimately degrades our dignity while increasing our vulnerability and discontent. It is antithetical to a broadly based commitment. Put another way, we all need insurance and we realize, whatever our level of education, that the price of insurance is determined to some extent by the odds of the pay out. But for the president of the United States to ask his armed forces to accept actuarial odds against their death that his administration has arbitrarily set could be criminal. Not to speak of taking our social security trust to Las Vegas for a bachelor party/prayer breakfast. (Hopefully my anger is evolving into commitment.)
There is so much greater in the general's favor than the uniform gap with the president. The initiative Clark must seize is support from the first responders, the reservists who must be mighty uncomfortable with current events, the troops in the field, the guys who are a lot like he was 20 years ago, who know they will stick with their commitment to service, but hate to think that when they get home, their brother-in-law is still going to be living in the guest room. (Give Kerry props for his recent endorsement from the national fireman's union. Too bad nobody gives a damn.)
But that gets us to a another, and very delicate point, about the similarity between various contemporary violent professions. Mercenaries, professional security, intelligence officers, criminals, conspirators, frauds, sociopaths, drug dealers, arms brokers, industrial spies, general officers, and big city detectives all have in common that they have committed to living with the threat of violence because they live with the enemy. We pay a lot of guys to shoot at each other rather than us, either with our taxes or our consumer purchases.
Wesley Clark views the phenomenon of the first-person shooter game and its impact on crime from the perspective of a space station. That's the irony of the nickname his less-than-enamored subordinates allegedly gave him: "The Supreme Being." Napoleon has a resonance here as well, which is why DeLay's olboquy, Clark's a "blow-dried Napoleon" rings ironically true. The base of Napoleon's early support was due to his brilliance as an artillery strategist, but the foundation of his mission was his troops' embodiment of his physical, moral, emotional, and intellectual commitment. All good soldiers must love the study of history and that study is broader and richer than the mere employment of best practices.
No matter how Wesley Clark runs, he is a campaigning civics lesson. He has run a gauntlet already and made some enemies. Yet once more, he has re-enlisted. Faced with a potential adversary who has Air Force One at his command, the general is traveling in borrowed planes. If Wesley Clark fully connects with his inner citizen, the man who knew he was only borrowing the chateau in Belgium, we cannot all help but benefit. One of his colleagues called him "a national treasure." It seems unlikely that encomium was prompted by Gen. Clark's tipping him to an inside stock trade.
If we need the Army more than ever, it follows that Wesley Clark's mission is to support it. Wouldn't it be ironic if fifty years out the General's reformation of what it means to serve our country under arms resulted in an overall decline in the misuse of firearms, without special legislation to dictate it.
