The Clark Critique - Newsweek excerpt from General Clark's forthcoming book, Winning Modern Wars
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, many in the Bush administration seemed most focused on a prospective move against Iraq. This was the old idea of “state sponsorship”—even though there was no evidence of Iraqi sponsorship of 9/11 whatsoever—and the opportunity to “roll it all up.” I could imagine the arguments. War to unseat Saddam Hussein promised concrete, visible action.
I WENT BACK through the Pentagon in November 2001, and one of the senior military staff officers had time for a chat. Yes, we were still on track for going against Iraq, he said. But there was more. This was being discussed as part of a five-year campaign plan, he said, and there were a total of seven countries, beginning with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. So, I thought, this is what they mean when they talk about “draining the swamp.” It was evidence of the Cold War approach: Terrorism must have a “state sponsor,” and it would be much more effective to attack a state than to chase after individuals, nebulous organizations, and shadowy associations.
He said it with reproach—with disbelief, almost—at the breadth of the vision. I moved the conversation away, for this was not something I wanted to hear. And it was not something I wanted to see moving forward, either. What a mistake! I reflected—as though the terrorism were simply coming from these states. Well, that might be true for Iran, which still supported Hezbollah, and Syria, complicit in aiding Hamas and Hezbollah. But neither Hezbollah nor Hamas were targeting Americans. Why not build international power against Al Qaeda? But if we prioritized the threat against us from any state, surely Iran was at the top of the list, with ongoing chemical and biological warfare programs, clear nuclear aspirations, and an organized, global terrorist arm.
And what about the real sources of terrorists—U.S. allies in the region like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia? Wasn’t it the repressive policies of the first, and the corruption and poverty of the second, that were generating many of the angry young men who became terrorists? And what of the radical ideology and direct funding spewing from Saudi Arabia? Wasn’t that what was holding the radical Islamic movement together? What about our NATO allies, whose cities were being used as staging bases and planning headquarters? Why weren’t we putting greater effort into broader preventive measures?
The way to beat terrorists was to take away their popular support. Target their leaders individually, demonstrate their powerlessness, roll up the organizations from the bottom. I thought it would be better to drive them back into one or two states that had given them support, and then focus our efforts there.
And if we wanted to go after states supporting terrorism, why not first go to the United Nations, present the evidence against Al Qaeda, set up a tribunal for prosecuting international terrorism? Why not develop resolutions that would give our counterterrorist efforts the greater force of international law and gain for us more powerful leverage against any state that might support terrorists, then use international law and backed by the evidence to rope in the always nuanced Europeans that still kept open trade with Iran and the others?
Business Week Online | September 29, 2003 | Clark: What's Wrong with U.S. Policy in Iraq
Business Week's Bruce Nussbaum gives WKC's forthcoming Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire a positive review and paraphrases some highlights.
His new book . . . is, in effect, Clark's campaign manifesto, providing insights into what he believes and what he would do as Commander-in-Chief. As a book, it is a smart take on the battlefield tactics used in Iraq as well as a tough-minded critique of the military strategy and the geopolitical doctrine followed by the Bush Administration.
Agree or disagree with the four-star general, here is what he says:
-- The war in Iraq "has thus far been a perfect example of dominating an enemy force but failing to win the victory." Clark says the Administration made the classic mistake of equating the defeat of an enemy with achieving its larger political goal. That goal was to set up a democratic, stable, secular Iraq which would help stop terrorism. Clark argues that this required higher force levels and a different strategy . . . . The Pentagon's war strategy, in effect, had "a profound flaw -- the endgame."
-- The war in Iraq has weakened, not strengthened, the fight against terrorism "by diverting attention, resources and leadership, alienating allied supporters and serving as a rallying point for anyone wishing to do harm to the U.S. and Americans." . . . The Administration was caught up in the Cold War policy template of fighting states, not supranational terrorists such as al Qaeda, and was predisposed to attack Iraq well before September.
Safety can come only through joint intelligence and police work with close allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, he says, and through a greater focus on homeland security; regime change is a diversion. "Not only did the Bush Administration misunderstand the lessons of modern war, it made a policy blunder of historic proportions," he writes.
-- The Rumsfeld doctrine of making the U.S. military a smaller, more mobile, more high-tech force is responsible for the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and for the postwar chaos in Iraq. Clark, a four-star U.S. Army general, places the current debate over transforming the military within a broader fight between the Air Force and Army that goes back to World War II. This is one of the more intriguing aspects of his book. Clark says that the Air Force has been trying for decades to prove that it can win wars alone, without the Army, through decisive and devastating air power. Rumsfeld, of course, is an ex-Navy pilot and a believer in air power. Clark concedes that air power won out in Serbia and Kosovo. But while he backs high-tech warfare, Clark also sees boots on the ground as essential. Special Ops units working with the Air Force couldn't destroy al Qaeda, but a division of Army soldiers might have. "It was a strategic opportunity lost."
-- Iraq may destroy the all-volunteer Army. Clark spends dozens of pages exalting the bravery and abilities of the men and women of the armed forces in his book. But he warns that the U.S. Army is not an army of occupation. The "quasi-imperial" America envisioned by the neocons in the Bush Administration is not matched by the military force that is supposed to create it. Nor should it be, according to Clark. He argues that the U.S. military is built for war-fighting, not long-term policing.
-- American unilateralism is bad military policy and bad foreign policy. Clark sharply criticizes the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America paper that postulates a unilateral, preemptive foreign policy for the country. . . . In effect, he says that the U.S. doesn't do nation-building very well and should outsource it to the U.N.
Nussbaum concludes with this thumbs-up appraisal: Winning Modern Wars succeeds on many levels, including the Stephen E. Ambrose-like description of battles and tactics used by General Tommy Franks in pacing the war. Clark clearly admires the courage and capabilities of the soldiers on the ground. But he also presents a cogent critique of Pentagon leadership and White House politics. As a military man, his insights go beyond the predictable Republican-Democratic partisan dialogue. It's a valuable perspective no matter which candidate you vote for.
The New Republic Online: Mad About You, The Case for Bush Hatred by Jonathan Chait, 9/29/03
No stunning insights in Chait's analysis of why Bush inspires such a viscerally negative response, but he articulates what many only sputter.
Highlights:
Bush is never called to task for the radical disconnect between how he got into office and what he has done since arriving. Reporters don't ask if he has succeeded in "changing the tone." Even the fact that Bush lost the popular vote is hardly ever mentioned. Liberals hate Bush not because he has succeeded but because his success is deeply unfair and could even be described as cheating.
Conservatives believe liberals resent Bush in part because he is a rough-hewn Texan. In fact, they hate him because they believe he is not a rough-hewn Texan but rather a pampered frat boy masquerading as one, with his pickup truck and blue jeans serving as the perfect props to disguise his plutocratic nature.
Every aspect of Bush's personal history points to the ways in which American life continues to fall short of the meritocratic ideal.
Say what you will about WKC, he is meritocracy defined.
But perhaps most infuriating of all is the fact that liberals do not see their view of Bush given public expression. It's not that Bush has been spared from any criticism--far from it. It's that certain kinds of criticism have been largely banished from mainstream discourse.
This is why it hardly bothers me that Clark voted for Nixon or Reagan. "Discourse" should be a bi-partisan goal and thus an attempt to shine light upon the gray areas. Clinton's balanced budget came at the expense of certain entitlements. Similarly, Clark's worldview, particularly as it concerns foreign policy, might rightly be informed by significant Republican presidents.
The persistence of an absurdly heroic view of Bush is what makes his dullness so maddening. To be a liberal today is to feel as though you've been transported into some alternative universe in which a transparently mediocre man is revered as a moral and strategic giant. You ask yourself why Bush is considered a great, or even a likeable, man. You wonder what it is you have been missing. Being a liberal, you probably subject yourself to frequent periods of self-doubt. But then you conclude that you're actually not missing anything at all. You decide Bush is a dullard lacking any moral constraints in his pursuit of partisan gain, loyal to no principle save the comfort of the very rich, unburdened by any thoughtful consideration of the national interest, and a man who, on those occasions when he actually does make a correct decision, does so almost by accident.
There. That feels better.